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Abstract The paper discusses two recent approaches to schizophrenia, a phenomeno-
logical and a neuroscientific approach, illustrating how new directions in philosophy
and cognitive science can elaborate accounts of psychopathologies of the self. It is
argued that the notion of the minimal and bodily self underlying these approaches is
still limited since it downplays the relevance of social interactions and relations for the
formation of a coherent sense of self. These approaches also illustrate that we still lack
an account of how 1st and 3rd person observations can fruitfully go together in an
embodied account of disorders of the self. Two concepts from enactive cognitive
science are introduced, the notions of autonomy and sense-making. Based on these, a
new proposal for an enactive approach to psychopathologies of the self is outlined that
integrates 1st and 3rd person perspectives, while strongly emphasising the role of social
interactions in the formation of self. It is shown how the enactive framework might
serve as a basis for an alternative understanding of disorders of the self such as
schizophrenia, as a particular form of socially constituted self-organisation.
Keywords Enactive cognition . Autonomy. Sense-making . Enactive self . Disorders of
theself .Meaningofsymptoms .Enactiveapproach topsychopathology.Self-organisation .
Schizophrenia
1 Introduction
What cognitive scientists think about the nature of cognition has implications for
understanding mental disorders, i.e. when the mind goes wrong (Fuchs and
Schlimme 2009; Drayson 2009; Colombetti 2013). Today, cognitive science is in the
process of overcoming the traditional reductionist picture of the mind: the view that the
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mind resides inside the head and brain is rejected, and instead the idea is embraced that
cognition is embodied (e.g. Thompson and Varela 2001; Varela et al. 1993). Embodied
cognition is a vastly growing field and comprises several schools, differing with regards
to what Bembodiment^ means to them and which aspect of embodiment they focus on
(Kyselo and Di Paolo 2013). One school of embodied cognitive science - the enactive
approach - assumes that there is no clear-cut ontological split between the individual
and its environment, and that the embodied mind emerges through active engagement
with the world (Varela et al. 1993; Thompson 2007).1 An important methodological
assumption of the enactive approach is that the study of the mind requires the
consideration of first-person experience and consciousness (Lutz and Thompson
2003). On this view, pathologies of the mind are no longer reduced to dysfunctions
at the neurological level, but instead seen as disorders of embodiment and as dynam-
ically emergent. Explanations of mental disorders are proposed in terms of bodily
dysfunction and by considering phenomenological inquiry on bodily experience
(Drayson 2009). In this vein, Gallagher, for instance, has proposed that autism has to
do with disturbances of sensorimotor functioning, rather than dysfunctional abstract
high level cognitive function (Gallagher 2005). In addition to the lived subjective
experience of the patient, the (non-neural) body as well as the patient’s environment,
Colombetti has recently argued that, on the enactive view, explaining psychopathol-
ogies must also involve the emotional and affective dimension of the disorder
(Colombetti 2013).
This paper continues to explore fruitful linkages between the enactive approach to
cognitive science and psychopathology by way of critically contrasting it with two
recent approaches to schizophrenia. The first approach is Parnas and Sass’ phenome-
nological account of schizophrenia as a disorder of the minimal self (Parnas and Sass
2010), referring to a person’s basic bodily sense of self (Zahavi 2005). The second is a
neurobiological proposal by Ebisch and Gallese that explains the struggle of persons
with schizophrenia to maintain a boundary between themselves and others in terms of
dysfunctional multisensory integration in the patient’s brain (Ebisch and Gallese 2015).
The target of the following discussion is the notion of self (or subject, or person), the
relation between 1st person subjective experience and 3rd person explanation, as well as
the strategy applied for accounting for what is wrong in the case of a disorder of the
self. It is argued that both approaches presuppose a too narrow concept of the self and a
limiting account of psychopathology. The discussion highlights an important task for
embodied cognitive science: to integrate the bodily and social dimension in a unified
account of the self. Methodologically speaking, the goal of the paper is not to discard
the presented accounts but to value their insights and to elaborate on them from an
1 I consider the enactive approach to be part of the broader embodied approach in cognitive science. Then
again, there are different schools in enactive cognition that use the label Benactive^, each focusing on
particular aspects of cognition. The differences between the schools have mainly to do with a variation in
focus or topic or sometimes with the degree to which they are committed to a dynamical view of cognition.
For example, the sensori-motor approach investigates the role of active bodily movement and skills in
bringing about experiences. The radical enactivism approach focuses more on language and on the role of
narratives in shaping cognition. Neurophenomenology investigates first-person experiences in relation to
neurological activity. Finally, the autonomy-based approach aims not at explaining particular functions or
aspects of cognition but at an integrative framework for cognition, focusing particularly on foundational
research into the nature of cognitive identity (what is a cognitive system?) and cognition as a process (what is a
cognitive process?).
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enactive vantage point. Specifically, it is assumed that basic concepts from enactive
cognition, the notions of autonomy and sense-making (Di Paolo et al. 2010; Thompson
2007; Kyselo 2014) can inspire a more encompassing view on the self and a comple-
mentary perspective on 1st person and 3rd person perspectives. They offer a suitable
framework to integrate valuable insights in recent accounts of disorders of the self: the
emphasises of the bodily self, subjective experience as well as of intersubjectivity.
The paper is structured as follows: first, I introduce the two recent approaches to
understanding schizophrenia as a disorder of the self, Parnas and Sass’ account of
schizophrenia in terms of the minimal self (Parnas and Sass 2010) and Ebisch and
Gallese’s neurobiological account (Ebisch and Gallese 2015). I summarize their essen-
tial insights but then critically discuss possible limitations with regards to the notion of
self and their view of the nature and genesis of psychopathology.2 In the second part of
the paper, I introduce the notions of autonomy and sense-making, and explore more
constructively how these concepts serve as the basis for three general principles for
explaining disorders of the self. Finally, and coming back to the discussion of schizo-
phrenia, these principles are applied to illustrate how an enactive perspective on
disorders of the self can begin to elaborate and complement previous embodied and
social approaches to schizophrenia.
2 Schizophrenia as a disorder of the self: new approaches in embodied
cognition
There is broad consensus in current embodied cognitive science that selfhood is
grounded in the living body. Generally speaking, to consider psychopathologies of
the self in terms of embodied cognitive science, thus means to consider them as
alterations of the embodied self, either in terms of disturbed bodily structures and/or
in terms of an altered sense of bodily self (e.g. Fuchs 2005; Fuchs and Schlimme 2009;
Gallagher 2005; Parnas and Sass 2010). There are also approaches that focus on
patients’ disturbed capacities as a social self. These approaches aim to shed light on
understanding the biological mechanisms underlying disturbances of understanding
others (the problem of other minds) and the capacity to distinguish between self and
others (Frith 2004; Ebisch and Gallese 2015; Ford et al. 2008; Gallagher and Vargas
2015). In what follows I focus on two approaches that illustrate how an emphasis on the
body and the bodily sense of self, as well as the underlying mechanism of social
cognition, can help shed light on disorders of self. Both approaches focus on the case of
schizophrenia.
2.1 Schizophrenia as a disorder of the bodily self
Parnas and Sass suggest to consider schizophrenia as a disorder of the so-called
minimal self (Parnas and Sass 2010). The minimal self is a concept from phenomenol-
ogy. It refers to the bodily sense of the self and our self-experience as a unified being
2 I will focus on Ebisch and Gallese’s proposal because of their emphasis on the social and the self-other
distinction, which chimes well with embodied cognition, even though in other respects they might seem
incompatible with embodied cognitive science and remain neuro-centric.
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(Zahavi 2005). More specifically the bodily sense of self is described as an experience
of Bfor-me-ness^ that accompanies all other experiences, rendering them Bmine^. This
sense of self is called minimal because, so Zahavi argues, it is the most basic and
constitutive requirement for the self, i.e. without a sense of mineness, there is no
selfhood. The minimal (sense of) self is composed of three dimensions that together
bring about a coherent sense of self: Bself-presence^, which refers to the mentioned
sense of Bfor-me-ness,^ first-person perspectivity pertaining to the experience of having
a personal viewpoint in space and time, and phenomenality, referred to as the basic
consciousness underlying all other phenomenal experiences. The minimal self is an
innate property of the human organism and it is also present in animals (Parnas and
Sass 2010). As Zahavi argues, the minimal self is prior to the social dimension of the
self. This claim is what I take issue with below.
Parnas and Sass’ proposal is that the minimal self is affected in schizophrenia. They
argue that the core disorder in schizophrenia is that the bodily self Bloses its automa-
ticity and transparency^ (ibid., p. 231). To explain this they rely on a concept by
Minkowski, the so-called trouble générateur (Minkowsk 1933/1970). As this concept
is vital to Ebisch and Gallese’s as well as my own alternative reflections, let me briefly
explain it.
Minkowski argues that any psychopathology involves two aspects, an Bidea-
emotional^ aspect and a structural aspect (Minkowski 1933/1970, p. 108). The idea-
emotional aspect refers to the level of psychopathological processes at which symptoms
are expressed and at which we can understand, through sympathy, what the patient
experiences. The Bstructural^ aspect has to do with the particular structure that is
assumed to underlie the mental disorder. Minkowski calls it the trouble générateur,
which can be translated as Bgenerating disorder^ (ibid., p. 103). It is the Binner
structure^ of the pathology, a deeper logic, or framework, based on which all symptoms
can be interrelated (ibid., p. 104). The trouble générateur presumably directly deter-
mines and intervenes on the patient’s personality as a whole. For that reason, according
to Minkowski, we should focus on the change of the person as a whole, not on
particular psychopathological processes or functions in order to understand psychopa-
thology. It is thus natural to ask what Minkowski took the structures of normal human
personality to be. According to him, normal human personality is a Bmental form of
life^ and equates with the Bliving ego^ that situates itself in the world, through feelings
and emotions (ibid., p. 111). And a crucial aspect of this situatedness lies, according to
Minkowksi, in a person’s ability to Baffirm the ego^. In others words, the trouble
générateur affects the organisation or structure underlying a person’s coherent sense of
self. For that reason, Minkowski urges to conduct a phenomenological analysis to
understand what structures and Bspatiotemporal relations^ the human ego usually uses
to affirm itself (ibid., p. 112).
When Parnas and Sass rely on the notion of the minimal self they therefore follow
Minkowski’s call for an elucidation of the ways in which the living ego affirms itself: it
does so in terms of a person’s lived bodily experience (Parnas and Sass 2010). The
coherence of the self is brought about through the organismic human body. Parnas and
Sass proposal is that the trouble générateur in schizophrenia has to do with a funda-
mental disturbance of the bodily coherence of self, i.e. of Zahavi’s mentioned experi-
ence of Bfor-me-ness^ underlying all experience. Schizophrenia is based on disorders
within the three dimensions of the minimal self such that symptoms can be explained
594 M. Kyselo
firstly with regard to their interrelation and as aspects of a general Bexperiential whole^
(Parnas and Sass 2010, p. 240). For instance, alienation, a common symptom in
schizophrenia is understood as a deviation from one’s normal sense of self-presence
(the first dimension of the minimal self). Another symptom, hyperreflexivity, could be
associated with disorders of the third dimension of the self, i.e. phenomenality. The
second explanatory advantage of their proposal arguably is that it allows us to under-
stand the transition between symptoms and their causal linkages. Accordingly, some
symptoms in schizophrenia Bmay be viewed as consequences, whereas others as
compensatory, coping attempts^ (ibid., p. 241). One example for this would be the
presumed interrelation of the symptom of alienation and that of social isolation: a
person’s experienced bodily alienation, explained in terms of a disturbed sense of self-
presence, is seen as the cause of social isolation.
Parnas and Sass’s proposal sheds light on the structure of the normal living ego in
terms of the living body, which situates the person in the world. I argue that there are
two issues with this proposal that invite more elaboration. However, let me first
introduce a recent neuroscientific perspective on schizophrenia, which can be seen as
a complement to Parnas and Sass’ account.
2.2 Schizophrenia as dysfunctional neurological disintegration
While Parnas and Sass consider the perspective of the embodied self as lived and
experienced, Ebisch and Gallese assess the neurobiological mechanism underlying the
experience of the embodied self (Ebisch and Gallese 2015). They thereby focus
explicitly on symptoms of the self in the intersubjective domain, that is, disturbances
in the social capacities of the person such as empathy, as well as the ability to
distinguish self from others. Like Parnas and Sass, Ebisch and Gallese also make a
proposal for the trouble générateur in schizophrenia. In their view it should be defined
in terms of neurobiological processes.3 Their argument is thereby structurally similar to
that of Parnas and Sass. It relies on an account of abnormalcy in terms of the absence of
normal functioning: in healthy subjects the (bodily) sense of self is based on a
multisensory integration of particular brain activities in the premotor cortex. A multi-
sensory integration is the normal prerequisite for making the distinction between self
and others. Making this distinction between self and other is a social capacity of the
individual, which itself correlates with differentiated responses in the posterior insular
cortex. Ebisch and Gallese observe that subjects diagnosed with schizophrenia show
disrupted multisensory integration in their brain, and they also show neuronal dysfunc-
tion correlating with the capacity to distinguish self-representations from other-repre-
sentations. There is, they argue, Babnormal functional connectivity^ between the two
brain complexes, the premotor and insular cortices, and they suggest that this neuronal
incapacity to integrate shifts from self to other-based bodily experience causes the
severe social deficits attributed to patients with schizophrenia. For Ebisch and Gallese,
the trouble générateur, the basic structure which underlies the disorder of the self in
schizophrenia, is thus equal to dysfunctional or Baberrant^ physiological structures
3 This is actually not in accordance with Minkowski’s structural approach, which rejects a causal explanation
of psychopathology in terms of physiological deficiencies (Minkowski 1933/1970, p. 107).
The enactive approach and disorders of the self 595
underlying the bodily sense of self and the ability for a self-other distinction (Ebisch
and Gallese 2015, pp. 228–234).
Ebisch and Gallese’s proposal can be seen as complementary to Parnas and Sass’
account. It offers a neurobiological explanation of what constitutes disturbances of the
coherent sense of self and thus parallels Parnas and Sass’ first-person description of
(some of) the phenomenology of schizophrenia with a third-person causal explanation
of the disorder. But how are these perspectives related? In the following I argue that
even though the two accounts adopt different perspectives - one is descriptive, the other
causal - they share two epistemological presumptions that invite further questions: the
view of the self as primarily body-based, a tendency to overlook the role of social
interaction in the generation of the disorder and the presumed explanation of a disorder
in terms of the absence of normalcy.
3 Worries with current approaches to schizophrenia
Both proposals conceive of schizophrenia as a disorder of the self. This is not obvious
because researchers have only recently began focusing more explicitly on the self or
person as point of departure for understanding the disorder (Kean 2009; Parnas and
Sass 2003). By considering schizophrenia as a disorder of subjectivity, in its bodily and
intersubjective dimension, and by focusing on the person and self who exhibits the
disorder, the authors depart from a classical reductionistic picture, according to which
schizophrenia is mainly associated with severe cognitive dysfunction. Parnas and Sass’
account thereby on the one hand clearly makes a contribution to so-called phenome-
nological psychiatry (Jaspers 1968; Fuchs 2002), which considers subjective reports to
be crucial elements in an explanation of the disorder’s nature. Ebisch and Gallese, on
the other hand, emphasize that a great part of suffering in schizophrenia stems from the
fact that the person has severe problems in relating to other subjects. Their proposal
reminds us that a great part of symptomatic experiences in schizophrenia concern the
person’s social functioning.
Both proposals also share a particular view of the nature of the self as essentially
embodied, presupposing that the sense of self emerges as a property of the living
organism (including the brain). The two accounts of schizophrenia are examples of
a more progressive account of psychopathology, which can be summarised in terms
of an emphasis on subjective experience, sociality, and embodiment. However, their
approach invites two further questions that importantly already pertain to the
‘normal’ case: how do experience, sociality and embodiment interrelate? And what
exactly is the authors’ strategy for explaining psychopathology? Let me discuss the
latter question first.
3.1 Schizophrenia as the absence of the normal experience
Parnas and Sass suggest that experiences in schizophrenic selfhood are disorders of
experiences of normal selfhood and at the same time they say that the sense of self in
schizophrenia is absent or opposed to the normal. While this observation might me
valid, this view of psychopathology is also limited. Indeed, it falls under a strategy that
one can call a Ba mere change of the sign^ (Merleau-Ponty 2002/1945, pp. 123–124).
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On such a view, the disorder is seen as the absence of the normal and the normal is the
absence of the disorder.
One has to acknowledge that self-experience in schizophrenia deviates from what
counts as ‘normal’ self-experience. It allows us to differentiate psychopathological
states from non-psychopathological states. Phenomenology is thus clearly a useful tool
to help with this task, since it provides more accurate descriptions of both the structures
of psychopathological and non-psychopathological self-experience. However, the prob-
lem with this change-of-sign strategy is that the disorder is not accounted for beyond
stating that there is, indeed, an absence of a proper or normal sense of self-presence.
But, as Minkowski had written in objecting to Jaspers’ phenomenological approach to
psychiatry (Jaspers 1912/1968): an account of psychopathology must not merely
collect descriptions but also reveal something about the organizational structure under-
lying the symptoms (Minkowski 1933/1970). The same point was made by Merleau-
Ponty in his reflections on psychic blindness (Merleau-Ponty 2002/1945, pp. 118–150).
Illness, he argues, is a Bcomplete form of existence^ and so in order to account for it we
need to go beyond Bnoting things as present or absent^. Instead one has to comprehend
symptoms and understand their deeper meaning and function in relation to the person
as a whole. This therefore transcends mere descriptions or assumption of material
causes (ibid. pp. 132–133). Merleau-Ponty’s worry applies to both Parnas and Sass’ as
well as Ebisch and Gallese’s account.
Admittedly, Parnas and Sass’ proposal entails an argument about the organizational
structure of the self: it is bodily and it is experienced as a profound sense of Bfor-me-
ness^. But this organization does not figure in their explanation of the disorder other
than that it is seen as a direct alteration of what counts as normal. This is unfortunate
because it also risks downplaying the relevance of a patient’s subjective experiences. At
first glance this worry might seem counter-intuitive, for isn’t their idea precisely that
subjective reports are relevant? So in what sense does their account downplay such
reports? The reason is that while initially the authors refer to the subjective perspective
of the patient, i.e. of the person who has or is a disordered self in trying to understand
the subject’s struggle, and thus in accounting for the meaning or role of the patient’s
symptomatic experiences, the authors shift to another person’s first-person experience.
This perspective belongs to that of the average subject who embodies a habitual sense
of self, a sense of self which in a given society counts as acceptable or habitual
experience of selfhood. What then is missing is an understanding of meaning
and value from the actual patient’s viewpoint, or an empathetic stance of
understanding symptoms through Bputting oneself into the patient’s shoes^
(Jaspers 1912/1968). Parnas and Sass make sense of symptomatic experience
by comparing it to the normal case, but how are the reports related to the
particular patient’s existence or self as a whole?4 For Parnas and Sass, expe-
riences appear to matter as a confirmation that something is wrong. For
example, understanding that an experience of alienation is part of a more
complex bodily self-experience. However, why is it that the patient would feel
alienated and what has alienation actually has to do with the disorder?
4 This question also holds more specifically when, in their descriptions of the experiences of the person with
schizophrenia, the authors do not consider a particular but Bgeneralized^ patient exhibiting symptoms
recognized as invariant across different individuals.
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Similarly, to say that the patient is socially isolated because she is alienated does not
consider what being alienated or feeling alone means for the patient herself. Such an
account underestimates the deeper relation between experience and the subject’s total
being. It limits the trouble générateur to a descriptive stance.
This has of course to do with the concept of the minimal self underlying Parnas and
Sass’ approach. It is a phenomenological concept and seeks to describe experiences and
the structure of experiences as they present themselves and not to explain them in terms
of their scientific causes. However, as I argue below, an understanding of disorders of
the self remains limited when the experiences are not related to the actual person who
has them. This is different from asking for the physiological causes of an experience.
We still need to explain the genesis of symptoms and how they are interrelated, i.e. in
terms of what Jaspers has called Bgenetic understanding^. Such understanding requires
a perspective that transcends the descriptive level of psychological processes and of
phenomenological analysis (Jaspers 1912/1968). Phenomenological descriptions in
terms of the minimal self lack an account of normativity, by which I mean the sense
in which experiences can matter or have value for a person’s self. I take this to be the
main point behind Merleau-Ponty’s criticism, as well as behind Minkowski’s concept
of the trouble générateur. Both Minkowski’s Bego^ and Merleau-Ponty’s Btotal being^
refer to an underlying third that transcends both symptoms and experiences and yet also
stands in relation to them. I argue below that without such a normative account linking
experiences (and thus symptoms) to subjectivity in general we can neither understand
experiences in psychopathology nor why and how they should play a role for the
patient.5 We see in the next section that Ebisch and Gallese’s proposal entails a similar
problem.
3.2 A causal and neurophysiological account of schizophrenia
In contrast to Parnas and Sass, Ebisch and Gallese consider subjectivity in terms
of its neurological basis and suggest that the social deficits and symptoms in
schizophrenia are caused by dysfunctional neurological mechanisms. Ebisch and
Gallese’s proposal is part of a recent trend in neurophenomenology attempting
to link phenomenological insight more closely to neuroscientific observations
concerning the relation between the bodily dimension of self and intersubjec-
tivity. At first glance, one might argue that they thus accommodate one of the
noted limitations in Parnas and Sass’ proposals, namely to provide an explana-
tion beyond psychological processes. For example, they argue that Babnormal
intensity of neural activity in sensorimotor circuits might contribute to the
phenomenon that others’ experience is perceived as ours^ (Ebisch and Gallese
2015, p. 225) and that the Babsence of vicarious activation in certain regions of
primary sensory cortex when witnessing others being touched could be co-
responsible for the absence of real first-person bodily feelings during social
perception^ (ibid., p. 226). The authors are thus careful to emphasize that
5 Note that although related, this concern should not be confused with the hard problem of consciousness, and
the question of qualia, or the assumed gap in accounting for what a given experience really feels like for a
person. The question of the meaning of subjective experience is not about the privacy of experience and why it
has a Bfeel^ to it at all, but rather about the role that the experience plays for the person, both with regard to and
in the context of the person’s making sense of her self and the world.
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particular brain regions are Bco-responsible,^ but their wording suggests that the
disrupted sense of self in schizophrenia is ultimately caused by neurological
dysfunction. However, while their account goes beyond phenomenological con-
siderations, Ebisch and Gallese’s argument risks being tautologic (Kyselo 2015).
It basically says that there are two kinds of neural correlates — on the one
hand, neurological activities that correlate with a disturbed sense of self — and
on the other, neurological activities that correlate with a disturbed self-other
distinction. Their explanation then consists of a combination of both kinds of
neural activities in that the inability to establish a boundary correlates with a
dysfunction of the interrelation between the two neurological dysfunctions.
However, this only explains one neurological activation pattern with another.
As valid as the observation might be that a person’s brain shows altered brain
activity, such alteration does not account for why a person has experiences
classified as symptomatic to begin with, not if the point is to say more than
that any experience a person has is accompanied by some activation pattern in
her brain.
Similar to Parnas and Sass, Ebisch and Gallese thus employ a Bmere exchange of
fore sign^-strategy, exchanging the sign with regard to the person’s normal and
abnormal neurophysiology. They explain one physiological cause in terms of another.
As a consequence, though initially deemed essential by the authors for understanding
the disorder, the argument downplays the insight that patients experience severe
problems in the social dimension. One might ask what the point in considering
patients’ phenomenological reports of their struggle is when the subjects’ reports are
only taken as a confirmation of the fact that they differ from the healthy case and
correlate with Babnormal^ neuronal function? The valid insight of patients’ reports that
their disorder involves difficulties differentiating between self and others risks being
jeopardised because these experience are not understood with regard to the patients’
perspective and self as a whole but rather compared on the basis of an external and
generalized standard of normalcy. In Parnas and Sass, the external standard is defined
in terms of idealised and societal normative expectations about what a healthy sense of
self must feel like, and has to do with the intuition that the body is what makes us a
unified centre of being. In Ebisch and Gallese, it is defined in terms of medical and
neurobiological norms about which neural activity should correlate with an individual’s
social abilities. But what the symptomatic experiences mean with regard to the person
or self having them, or why the distinction between self and others would matter at all,
remains unclear. I will come back to these issues in the subsequent section on enactive
cognition. But let me now formulate a second worry with regard to the two proposals.
3.3 Individualism downplays the role of the social
In the previous section I clarified the perspective on psychopathology adopted by the
authors. In this section I ask what epistemological background they thereby assume,
especially regarding the nature of self and its relation to the body and the social. Both
accounts actually entail a similar argument about their interrelation: the sense of self is
grounded in a bodily experience of for-me-ness, i.e. of a coherent sense of one’s own
self and therewith the ability to distinguish one’s own experiences from those of others.
This coherence and differentiation from other people is seen as a prerequisite
The enactive approach and disorders of the self 599
for being able to engage in relations to them. Consequently, when a patient
shows disturbances of the bodily sense of self then these must lead to distur-
bances in the person’s relations with others. The same relation holds vice versa.
When a person has disturbances in her ability to relate to others, then this is
due to a disturbance of the (bodily) self. This view makes two important
presumptions: first, that the minimal self is a property of the body and that
the body’s boundaries are given through the individual physiological body,
beginning and ending at the border of one’s skin, and second, that our social
capacities and the ability to distinguish oneself from the other are capacities of
the individual person. On this view, the core of subjectivity and the human self
is not social, but solely grounded in the individual body (brain). This view on
the nature of the self as essentially bodily has been criticised. Indeed, it
amounts to the so-called Bbody-social problem^, the systematic problem in
philosophy of cognitive science to interrelate the bodily and social dimensions
in a unified perspective of the individual human self (Kyselo 2014). The view
of the self as equal to the body risks an isolated view of the self and a
dichotomy between the subject and its social environment, while viewing the
self as essentially social risks losing the subject in the interaction process.
Indeed, as shown above, Parnas and Sass’ proposal is based on the minimal self, and
thus on the phenomenology of individual embodiment. The self-affective organism
which grounds the minimal self is concerned with Bobstacles, tools, objects of the
desires^ (Parnas and Sass 2010, p. 236). It is, however, explicitly not concerned with
(experiences of) intersubjectivity. The constituents of a disorder of subjectivity are thus
to be found solely within the brain or body of the single subject. Problems in the
intersubjective domain are caused by disturbances of bodily processes of the individual
but they do not matter themselves in the constitution of a coherent sense of self. This
presumption seems to be the reason for why they are also not included in Parnas and
Sass’ account of the trouble générateur in schizophrenia.6 But if schizophrenia was a
disorder of the minimal bodily self, then the analysis of the spectrum of symptoms
should at the most be concerned with disturbances at the level of object perception, say,
as in hallucinations. Overlooked is, however, the fact that an abundance of symptoms in
schizophrenia concern a person’s social capacities.7
The point of these considerations is not to argue with the usefulness of a phenom-
enological account of schizophrenia. However, the preoccupation with the minimal self
as bodily clouds the phenomenological lens so that there is an overemphasis on the self
as separate subject, while downplaying the open and relational dimension of self and
self-experiences. Phenomenological psychiatry also has to understand what social
symptoms in schizophrenia could mean and express with regard to the person who
has them.
6 Following Zahavi, Parnas and Sass acknowledge the interrelation of minimal and social narrative self
(Parnas and Sass 2010, p. 230). In their proposal however they solely rely on the former. They explicitly
disregard Bimportant developments pertaining (for example) to intersubjectivity and temporality^ (ibid., p.
232, my italics).
7 The self qua being equated with the individual body would have to be a locus of separation from others. But
then isolation should not only be a symptom of schizophrenia but should already be part and parcel of normal
subjectivity.
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The social dimension of schizophrenia is explicitly mentioned in Ebisch and
Gallese’s proposal. But it suffers from a similar problem because it does not integrate
this insight in their account of the trouble générateur, arguing instead that the locus of
the disorder is the individual’s living body. When the authors speak of the patient’s
Breduced capacity^ (p. 228), Binability to resonate^ (p. 222), and her Baberrant brain
function^ (p. 231), it becomes clear that the symptoms are seen as brought forth by the
subject (or her brain, to be more precise) in isolation. In their account, intersubjective
engagements play a role only in terms of neurological correlates of the result of social
disturbances. This again reflects the mentioned solipsistic view of selfhood, leading to a
view of psychopathology in which the responsibility and genesis of the disorder lies
entirely within the patient. Even though schizophrenia is observed to consist in a
struggle of the social ability to distinguish self from other, the fact that this struggle
exists in the realm of social interactions does not figure in the explanation of schizo-
phrenia itself.
To conclude this section, both the phenomenological and neurobiological ap-
proaches to schizophrenia presented appear to merely confirm that there exists a
disorder at their respective level of explanation. Accepting either stance on schizophre-
nia leaves us with a misleading choice: either adopting a descriptive stance on
symptoms, as is the case with Parnas and Sass’s phenomenological proposal, without
understanding the disorder beyond the level of (partial) experiences of self, or provid-
ing a causal explanation in terms of physiology without understanding social experi-
ences or embodiment. Neither option relates explicitly to the question of what symp-
tomatic experience means to the subject as a whole. Both approaches reduce the
person’s self as a whole to the human body, revealing a solipsism and — in Ebisch
and Gallese’s case— a persistent cognitivism according to which the brain is the seat of
control. Both accounts can be seen as expressions of the body-social problem and are at
risk of brushing over subjective experience in the interpersonal dimension of the self.
This applies in two senses: through adapting a third-person evaluation of reports in
schizophrenia and through promoting an important, but also only partial dimension of
human self experience - being separate from other - to a conclusive fact about human
nature in general. However, human nature is not solipsistic, but deeply social. We
distinguish ourselves not from material objects, but from other subjects. And so we
experience our self not merely as an island but also as connected to others, as caring for
them and as being open to their influence. This fact has little relevance in the discussed
contributions. As a consequence, and contrary to what their proposals might initially
and rightfully suggest, the authors not only underestimate the role of the subject and its
struggle in psychopathology, but they also underestimate the subject and human social
experience in general.8
8 One might object to these considerations that Parnas and Sass actually attempt to provide an explanation of
symptoms in schizophrenia that not merely involves considering them as a deviation of what should be the
normal case. They argue for looping effects of symptoms, suggesting for example that social isolation can be
explained by linking it causally to the symptom of self-alienation. It is because the patient feels alienated that
she feels Bontologically different from others, and therefore alone^ (ibid., p. 233, original emphasis). Social
isolation is Ban outgrowth from within, from this inner sense of profound ontological solitude^ (ibid.).
However, this still explains one experience in terms of another, leaving not much room for an explanation
(of the genesis) of these experiences that transcends individual reports.
The enactive approach and disorders of the self 601
4 Toward an enactive account of disorders of the self
In this section I introduce the enactive approach to cognition and develop an alternative
understanding of psychopathology that does not require choosing between either a
descriptive stance or a causal explanation in terms of non-psychic processes, but instead
integrates them. The reason why I believe that the enactive approach is a good
candidate framework for shedding new light on pathologies of the self is that it
currently offers the most comprehensive account of cognition. Methodologically
speaking, the enactive approach begins considerations of the mind not by focussing
on particular dimensions or aspects, but by understanding the general nature of the
mind as a unified and living whole, and of mental processes as ways of preserving and
organising this whole. Based on this core principle, the enactive approach then
reassesses and seeks to integrate the various other dimensions and aspects of cognition.
Note that I do take it for granted that the enactive approach offers a useful theoretical
framework for understanding the mind. I do not wish to defend the approach on
theoretical grounds against other possible frameworks of cognition. I assume that the
basic idea of the enactive approach is worthwhile exploring and so my goal is to
elaborate on it by making a constructive contribution and by linking it to a concrete,
empirical case. To this end, I follow the enactive methodology by asking what insights
can be derived for an understanding of psychopathology when it is based on an
enactive account of the mind as a whole. Based on this, I offer steps for integrating
the discussed perspectives on schizophrenia.
Whether the following suggestions are valid cannot solely be decided by theoretical
inquiry. Ultimately it also depends on whether they allow to make better predictions
and help integrate empirical findings. In the following constructive part, I first introduce
the two core concepts of the enactive approach: autonomy and sense-making. Then I
provide the first enactive account of the trouble générateur in disorders of the self.
4.1 The enactive approach to cognition
The enactive approach assumes, firstly, that there exists a continuity between life and
mind (Thompson 2007; Di Paolo et al. 2010). This means that mental (or cognitive)
systems share fundamental properties with living systems, despite qualitative and
species-specific differences. These fundamental properties are that living and mental
beings are identities that emerge through self-organisation. Secondly, such systems
strive to maintain this identity and to generate meaning. They do this by evaluating
themselves and the world with regards to the goal of self-maintenance. Thirdly, the
emergence of living and mental identity generates a subjective viewpoint. What matters
to a living and mental system is not determined by norms external to the living being,
but depends on its self-organisation and on what it needs in order to keep it intact. Self-
organisation is inherently subjective because it involves a concern with the continuation
of existence. This is why the enactive approach adopts a complementary view of first-
person subjective insights and third-person organizational explanation. One cannot
fully be understood without the other since the two are integrated within the goal-
directed existence of the living and mental being (Hanna and Thompson 2003).
Fourthly, living and mental systems are embodied. It is through their body that they
maintain an identity and become acquainted with the world (Kyselo and Di Paolo 2013,
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Di Paolo and Thompson 2014). The following notions of autonomy and sense-making
serve as key concepts for integrating these properties.
4.1.1 Autonomy
The concept of autonomy refers to the identity of the cognitive system as a self-
organizing system. The notion is in principle applicable at several levels of description.
It can refer to the identity of an individual system, such as a cell, or a body, but also to
supra-identities of groups involving humans, be they dyads, institutions or even entire
nations. But classically, and in line with the topic of this paper, enactive autonomy
refers to the identity of an individual person or human being. The concept is associated
with a particular methodological key idea: namely to ground any analysis of cognition
in a view of the individual as a whole, instead of focussing on singular dimensions in
isolation. The notion aims at a principle to help determine an individual’s identity so as
to distinguish it from other similar individuals — for humans it is presumably that
which brings about a boundary between them as individual psycho-social beings. The
promise is that such a notion then helps to interrelate and group other, more particular,
properties and dimensions of human mental life and the organisation of the self.
A general and simple definition of autonomy is the following: an autonomous
system is a precarious, self-organized network of processes that brings about and
maintains an identity (following Maturana and Varela 1980; Thompson 2007).
Precarious refers to the fact that these processes of that network are organized such
that they enable and are enabled by each other, and thus together they ensure the
network identity maintains its structure and does not dissolve (Di Paolo 2009). The
formation of an autonomous identity is inconceivable without the environment. It
provides the processes that the organisation is made of. The environment thus does
not serve as context in which identities are embedded or situated in, but as active
ingredient of the network as a whole. This is reflected by the strong emphasis in the
enactive approach on a dynamical perspective concerning the relationship between
individuals and their environment. Individuals are not ontologically distinct from their
environment but identified against it in terms of their specific organization. This has
been referred to as operational closure.9 Operational closure allows the individual,
apart from becoming a distinguishable identity, to also shape and organize possible
interactions with the world. Thus, what counts as a cognitive system’s environment also
depends on the particular organization of the cognitive system’s identity (Von Uexküll
1958); it is what turns the world into Ba place of salience, meaning, and value^ for itself
(Stapleton and Thompson 2009).
Because autonomy consists of processes that together generate a bounded network,
the human self is seen as relational in nature. Until recently, these relations have been
specified in terms of the body and sensorimotor activity (Thompson 2005). However, a
new elaboration on the enactive self conceives of its constitutive processes in terms of
social interactions (Kyselo 2014). According to this, the self is thus primarily seen as a
9 This gives some hint at how the enactive notion of autonomy is related to that of other disciplines: it also has
to do with a certain independence of a person, but in the enactive approach, autonomy refers to a basic an
organizational independence bringing about the system as a biological, psychosocial or cultural identity.
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social structure and as co-enacted with others through interacting and relating to them.
It is the emerging result of a continuous complexity reduction of a person’s psychoso-
cial engagement with the world. The basic organization of the autonomous self is
assumed to combine two general types of psycho-social processes: acts of emancipation
(distinction) and acts of open-ness and readiness for perturbation by others (participa-
tion). This two-fold structure of distinction and participation is expressed as a striving
to be a person in one’s own right, distinct and separate from the other while also being
someone who is connected to others, and who can be affected and supported by them.
In contrast to the above discussed minimal self, on the enactive view, the coherent
sense of self is therefore not simply given through an individual’s body but rather
through relating the body to others. This explains why the sense of self actually has a
double nature: there is a sense of coherence through time, which involves experiencing
oneself as a separate and distinct unity, but there is also a sense of connection, open-
ness and belonging to others. A coherent sense of self is therefore not limited to the
experience of for-me-ness, since that would amount to solipsism. Humans are not
distinguished against other material objects, but against acting and goal-directed other
subjects. So subjectivity, as a reflection of human self-organisation, must also involve a
directedness towards the other. Indeed, the mentioned precariousness of autonomy
suggests that both distinction and participation, and thus both the self-experience of
mine-ness and of openness to the world of others, are required for the emergence of a
coherent sense of self.
4.1.2 Sense-making
The second key concept of the enactive approach is that of sense-making. While
autonomy refers to the identity of the cognitive system as an integrated whole, sense-
making denotes the relational and behavioral dimension of cognition (Thompson and
Stapleton 2009). Importantly, sense-making is implied in the notion of autonomy. Qua
generating an autonomous identity through organizational closure, a person produces a
perspective on the world from which she can act as the centre and by which she
separates herself from the rest of the world. This perspective emerges because a person
evaluates and probes the environment with regard to what matters to the continuation of
her own existence as a whole (Di Paolo 2009; Di Paolo et al. 2010). Here lies the basis
for human subjectivity. Qua being brought forth through the social world, the self
entails a fundamental existential normative bias. The autonomy-based view of the self
is therefore teleological and intrinsically purpose driven (Weber and Varela 2002). At
the heart of being a self lies a fundamental, intrinsic goal, to generate and maintain an
identity which integrates both tendencies: towards distinction and emancipation on the
one hand and participation and openness on the other. Since the self as a whole
comprises two dimensions and they are opposed, the bias also involves a need for
negotiating and integrating them so as to arrive at a quasi-stable equilibrium (a kind of
balance between distinction and participation). Extreme deviations from a state that
combines both a sense of separation and of connectedness— i.e., if the self was to rely
on either of the two kinds of relations and interactions by themselves — risks non-
adaptive forms of organization.10 For example, only (or too much of) distinction would
10 By ‘non-adaptive’ I rely on the notion of adaptivity as proposed by the enactive approach. See below.
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lead to isolation from others, whereas only (or too much of) participation would amount
to immersion and the risk of a loss of self in the other. Human social existence is neither
just isolated nor always with the other. Although, clearly, over a course of life every
person will develop particular tendencies that might favour one dimension over the
other.
Note that sense-making should not be understood as a mere rational, cogni-
tive act. Autonomous systems care and they are affected by what happens to
them. Enactive theorists consider this the basis for human and animal emotion
(Colombetti 2013, p. 18). It is also important to understand that sense-making
is not an all-or-nothing process, but involves adaptivity and flexibility (Di
Paolo 2005). Adaptivity means that humans do not only react to the world,
but also monitor and regulate their interactions with the world so as to improve
the conditions for maintaining their identity.
What are the implications of sense-making with respect to the self? Without offering
here a full-fledged enactive account of subjectivity and conscious experience, it is clear
that the autonomy based view of the self puts an important emphasis on subjectivity, on
the sense of self as it is experienced by the subject and also, and necessarily, on a
person’s experiences within the intersubjective domain. Again, not everything in the
world matters; instead, environmental and individual processes acquire a particular
status for the individual when they matter for the continuation of its identity. Being in
the world is thus always concerned and an act of evaluation. Sense making is what an
autonomous system does in order to Bknow^ and to change how it fares in its going
about in the world, or how it is situated in the temporal-spatial relation to the world.
Since humans are social beings, this must mean that our sense-making behavior brings
about a social perspective, both on the world and on oneself. From this perspective,
subjective experiences become relevant for the system’s self-organization because they
are the source of meaning for the autonomous system as a social agent. Experiences
generate relevant insights that relate directly to one’s existence in a world of others.
Without them nothing and no one could ever matter to us. They are the means by which
we evaluate whether our integrity as a psycho-social subject is safe and, more con-
cretely, whether and to which extent the two goals, of distinction and participation, are
in balance.11
This is precisely why enactive theorists emphasize the complementarity between
first-person and third-person explanations. To appreciate the circularity of first-person
and third-person perspectives, one has to keep in mind that at the heart of cognition
each mental and living being strives for the maintenance of self-organisation and for
evaluating the environment with respect to this goal. The self is intrinsically goal-
oriented. As a consequence, subjective experiences always relate to a person’s self as an
11 Elaborating the enactive view on the self, the notion of adaptivity (Di Paolo 2005) might play a role here in
the sense that the ability to oscillate between the two dimensions also requires flexibility. On the one hand, a
self must always change with regard to a two-fold norm (distinction and participation), ensuring that neither
dimension becomes too high or too low. On the other hand, since the oscillation is assumed to be enacted
through being with others, adaptive change would also depend on a subject’s social environment. The change
also depends on the extent to which relations and interactions enable an individual to balance her needs while
at the same also depend on the extent to which the oscillations and style of a person’s self organization meet
the expectations of a person’s social environment (family, friends, professional context, etc.).
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organisational whole. Their meaning cannot be fully determined on the grounds of
physiological facts, nor by comparison to externally derived meaning.12 The same logic
applies to understand the self from a third-person perspective. In this way, physiological
structures, be they neurological, sensorimotor or technology based, are seen as embed-
ded in a person’s existence as a social whole. They do not constitute this existence but
rather play a role in enabling the social processes that constitute it.
From this perspective, we can better appreciate why the body is important to the self.
The body is not only what establishes a boundary to others, being a place of separation
through skin and flesh. It is also that which opens us up, bringing us in contact with
other people and allowing us to relate and to connect to them. We saw that, according to
the minimal self, the body in isolation is what matters most to our self-organization as a
coherent whole. On the enactive view, it is rather how we bodily relate to others. The
body is better seen as a mediator of social existence, providing an ever-developing
matrix of social meaning and significance. Engagements and relations with others leave
traces, bodily memories of how particular styles of being with others felt to us and were
evaluated according to their contribution to the sense of self as emancipated and distinct
or open and supported (Kyselo 2014). At the same time, with our body, we continu-
ously evaluate our being in the world; through emotions, perceptions or thoughts we
can appreciate how particular interactions might be relevant with regard to the organi-
zation of our self, thus guiding action and behavior that continues to organize and shape
our engagements with others.13
This view on the self as an autonomous and sense-making system has a couple of
important implications that are relevant for developing an autonomy based view of
psychopathology. First, the maintenance of self is subject to a permanent tension that
can be experienced as a struggle. A person cares for self-preservation as long as she is
alive. A need for negotiation with and concern for others is inherent to this care (Kyselo
2014). Given that the two movements in this approach, distinction and participation, are
opposed, this leads to a tension that a person strives to overcome without ever fully
being able to. Second, based on the dynamical emergence and organization of the self,
we should not assume that the self is a given or fixed thing. Not only in childhood, but
also as long as a person is alive she relies on social interactions, relations, and has to
negotiate her identity through being with others. Having a body is not sufficient for
coherence of self. It needs to be continuously active, and that also means to be socially
active.14 Third, since the self is enacted together with others, it must also not be the sole
12 However, given that the self is an identity that is created with others, not every experience might be
comprehensible to the subject in isolation; she might need to interact and engage with others in order to
understand the significance. I argue that emotions such as shame and guilt provide a good example for this.
How one evaluates a shameful emotion can depend a lot on the social context and on the reaction of others to
her expression of it.
13 It is beyond the scope of the paper to explore this in more detail, but obviously the two senses of bodily
mediation could be seen as related. Past experiences can inform and shape future evaluations, and present
experiences can alter past evaluations.
14 Again, this chimes well with Merleau-Ponty’s perspective on the body, according to which the nature of our
behavior does not depend on our Bnormal^ biological capacities. Our abilities are shaped through our being
and acting in the world. Gail Weiss has recently offered an interesting overview of how Merleau-Ponty’s
insight has been used and interpreted in the context of race, feminist and disability studies. The bodies of
women and disabled people, for instance, are not naturally less capable but are seen as affected and limited
through the norms of a given society and thus through the limiting ways in which other people tend to relate to
them (Weiss 2015).
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result of an individual’s action, but rather emerge through joint engagement and effort.
This suggests that a person has only limited control over her self maintenance and is, if
partly, necessarily dependent on other subjects - other subjects have their own goals and
norms and evaluate and perturbate interactions accordingly. At times these perturba-
tions and goals might be in accord, but at others they might violate the individual’s
subjective goals and expectations. Finally, and following from the previous implica-
tions, the autonomy view of the self suggests that the human self is genuinely
vulnerable. It is vulnerable because, qua being relational, it is always incomplete and
needs to remain open, with respect to change and with respect to others.
4.2 Three principles for an enactive account of disorders of the self
In this section I outline how the enactive notions of autonomy and sense-making can
inform an approach to psychopathology of the self and thereby address the limitations
we encountered in the discussion of Parnas and Sass’ and Ebisch and Gallese’s
approach to schizophrenia. The first basic insight to this end is that the self is a form
of social self-organisation and that because it is concerned with self-preservation, it is
necessarily normative and goal-directed and thus infused by subjective values. The
second important idea is that self-preservation is not only relational, but a social
relational process. The self is continuously brought forth through social interactions
and relations. The third point is the mentioned complementarity of first-person and
third-person perspectives that are joined in the existence of the social self as a whole.
Based on these insights, I propose the following three principles for an autonomy-based
approach to psychopathology: existence as a whole, a circular view of symptoms as
expression and sense-making modality, and a view of psychopathology as an altered
form of striving for quasi-equilibrium in the organization of a person’s self.
4.2.1 Disorders of the self as a form of autonomous self-organization
The enactive approach begins considerations of the disordered human self by identi-
fying the subject who has the disorder. The answer is: the human being as a embodied
socially organised whole. A similar point was made by Merleau-Ponty, who suggested
that an illness has to do with the Bsubject’s total being^ and is itself a Bcomplete form of
existence^ (Merleau-Ponty 2002/1945, pp. 123–124) and Canguilhem, who argued that
diseases happen to the organism in its physiological entirety (Canguilhem 1991, p.
223). This point is also reminiscent of Minkowski’s quest to specify the structures of
the living ego and how it affirms and situates itself in temporal-spatial relation to the
world (see section 2.1).
On the enactive view of the self, the Bsubject’s total being^ or living ego is co-
enacted through relations and interactions with others. The subject is thus concerned
with the social resources that help enact it. The main proposal is that we should assume
that this continues to be the case in psychopathology. The argument for this is quite
simple: self-organization is that which distinguishes living systems from non-living
systems (Maturana and Varela 1980). A patient does not suddenly cease to be alive, she
still exists as a human being, and therefore also as a social and sense-making existence.
This means that as long as she is alive she is also and necessarily involved in self-
organization, concerned with its maintenance and thus following her own subjective
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goals. More specifically, this also means that the two-fold social bias of the enactive
self— to be someone in her own right while also being connected to others— and the
task to negotiate and co-negotiate the tension between them, remains. One can therefore
consider the disorder just as any other living human condition as a particular form of
self-organization, or better even, as a form of self-other organization. Self-organization
follows in principle the same logic for every human being, but there are more
particular forms of self-organisation. These vary from individual to individual, de-
pending on gender, age, social and cultural context. The enactive approach simply
extends this insight to all forms of human existence. Thus, while self-organization in
disorders of the self might come in altered forms but it serves essentially the same
purpose: to organize the patient’s psycho-social existence.
Methodologically speaking, this view would overcome the division between the
third-person causal or first-person descriptive stance, neither reducing the patient to her
brain (or body), as risked in Ebisch and Gallese’s approach, nor to her momentary
experiences, as risked in Parnas and Sass’s approach. As I explore in the next sections,
an enactive approach to psychopathology combines both stances in a perspective on the
patient as a socially organized whole.15 It thereby considers the person in a circular and
dynamical fashion through subjective experiences and evaluations of the person and,
from an organizational perspective, through both intra- and extra-bodily processes, as
well as the person in her relations and interactions to others.
4.2.2 Symptomatic experience as sense-making modality
A necessary consequence of caring for the integrity of our identity is that our behavior
is never neutral but always purpose-driven and infused by values and concern. Our
being in the world is always an act of sense-making and thus of evaluation, and it is a
social endeavour. Just as a patient does not suddenly cease to exist as a social existence
(autonomous self), she also does not suddenly cease to exist as a sense-making,
experiencing subject; the patient still has a subjective viewpoint on her existence from
which she monitors and regulates herself and her relations with others accordingly.
This, I suggest, is the deeper reason why experiences in illness matter vitally for
psychopathology research.
While it is indispensable to collect subjective data in the form of subjective reports,
this data still needs to be interpreted. This is where the enactive approach would
elaborate on current phenomenological approaches that mainly describe and compare
reports to the Bnormal case^. Clearly, we cannot deny that reports of suffering can be
extremely incomprehensible and vague, not only to the treating doctor but also to the
patient herself (Jaspers 1963). Moreover, patients often try to make sense of the
meaning of their experiences by means of verbal language, risking to blur or abstract
over about their concrete phenomenal nature. So in addition to describing symptoms,
one must also aim to understand their meaning beyond the appearance of phenomena
(Merleau-Ponty 2002/1945, p. 124, p. 132, Jaspers 1912/1968). The enactive approach
accommodates this task by considering the status of symptoms from an organizational
15 This is actually an elaboration of Evan Thompson’s earlier proposal for bridging subjective experience and
objective, material accounts, in conceiving of the mind as embodied existence (Thompson 2005).
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and systemic perspective, i.e., in terms of their role or status within the organization of
the self as autonomous whole. This allows us not only to consider experiences of a
particular subject, but it also offers a rough and ready heuristics for understanding them
empathetically, from a second person perspective. Even though a person’s experiences
are always her own, the idea that every self involves the negotiation of a two-fold goal
(distinction and participation) provides a way to account for experiences beyond the
personal report of a momentary subjective experience. Basically, one understands that
every experience is related to the person’s concern for her ability to exist as an
individual in her own right and/or to be connected and supported by others. This is
what it could mean to understand experiences in alignment with the person’s subjective
viewpoint even when these experience are radically different from what counts as
normal or familiar.16
From such a perspective, psychopathological symptoms are a form of sense-making
and can be seen as strategies for achieving the goal of self-preservation and for
evaluating whether or to which extent this goal can be achieved. For example,
symptoms of bodily alienation could be understood as an expression of a perceived
imbalance between being a person striving to exist in her own right or as someone open
and connected to the realm of others. In bodily alienation the body is no longer
prereflexively experienced as mediator of social existence, but as a hindrance and
material object. This makes sense against the person’s background as a social existence.
While the body might have become a hindrance in a person’s current ability to socially
relate, this might also be the result of already persisting problems in relating to others.
In this way, alienation can be seen as a bodily expression of an overemphasis of
distinction (the dimension of self that seeks individuality, and not openness to others).
The struggle with alienation might become intelligible when considered within the
logic of the subject’s need to counter-balance it with participation.
This perspective transcends the phenomenological level beyond descriptive purposes
without however giving up on understanding a particular person’s subjective experiences.
A pathology has, quite literally, to do with subjective suffering and Bthe feeling of life
gone wrong^ (Canguilhem 1991, p. 137). This point could be underestimated if it was not
also linked to the subject as a whole. Some symptoms can obviously be expressed in
behavioral terms and thus observed and compared from an external perspective as being
less adaptive, socially Binacceptable^, or Babnormal^ forms of being in the world.
However, first of all, within the deeper logic of self-organization, the struggle itself
would be seen as a form of evaluation, and thus, positively, as a form of adaptive care
taking. Suffering is then never just an expression of a physiological deficiency, nor of
16 I believe that Matthew Ratcliffe’s more encompassing phenomenological approach to mental illness accords
well with this project (Ratcliffe 2012). Ratcliffe emphasizes that in order to understand experiences in mental
illness we should bracket our usual assumption of a Bshared world^ as the basis for empathising with another
person. Instead, we should open up to the possibility that, in mental illness, not just the content but the very
structures of experiences are altered. Ratcliffe proposes radical empathy as a phenomenological stance, by
which he means being ready to be affected by the alterity of the other person’s experience rather than trying to
understand it by comparison to something already known (p. 483). Radical empathy is thus not limited to a
first-person perspective. It means one must adopt a mode of Bopen^ engagement with the experience of
another person. I think that the enactive understanding of the self as an autonomous system that is striving to
maintain its self-organization as basically open to and distinct from others provides a complement to
Ratcliffe’s strategy. It offers a heuristic from which empathy can arise through the insight that we are equal
in existence, even though the particular ways we organize this existence might differ.
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abnormal behavior, but rather of the subject’s particular struggle as an intentional social
being in the world. Symptoms appear as testimonials of a suffering from violated
subjective norms, derived from the basic two-fold goal to integrate the opposed goals
of distinction and participation that make up the enactive self.
We can now formulate a second step towards an autonomy-based approach to
psychopathology that reflects the structure of (normal) sense-making: symptoms can
be both an expression of a person’s struggle to maintain the self as socially co-enacted
network, as well as of the person’s subjective evaluations of that struggle, but also a
person’s attempt to make up for an experienced struggle in achieving the goal of self-
maintenance. By linking the understanding of symptoms to the subject’s purpose driven
existence as a whole, the enactive approach might provide a middle way between the
descriptive and causal stance and help to illuminate symptoms that appear unintelligible
at first glance.17
4.2.3 The equilibrium hypothesis: an enactive account of the trouble générateur
Based on two basic steps for an autonomy-based view of psychopathology: 1) adopt a
perspective on the patient’s existence as a whole subject, i.e. the self as socially
organized existence, and 2) assume a continuity of striving for self-preservation and
for sense-making, in this section, I now offer a general enactive view of the trouble
générateur in psychopathologies of the self.
This view will be in accordance with Minkowski’s structural approach, conceiving
of psychopathology as a form of mental life that continues to be, though perhaps
different at first take, a form of life. The basic hypothesis is that it is precisely because
of the social structure and precariousness of human self-organization that a psychopa-
thology can develop to begin with: we have learned that firstly, the structure of the self
is inherently fragile because it is the result of the ongoing attempt to maintain a balance
between emancipation from others and being connected to them. It is fragile because
not only is this an open-ended process requiring continuous engagement, but also
because the conditions of this engagement have to be continuously negotiated with
other people. For that reason the self is also inherently and necessarily vulnerable to the
influence of others. Secondly, a person, through her subjective experiences, tracks the
process of self-organisation. She is thus able to perceive and identify risks and
tendencies of imbalance and/or balance in self-organization. When a person experi-
ences particular difficulties in integrating the influences on her self-organisation
brought forth through her relations with others, and when she evaluates them as
harmful, she can suffer and ultimately develop behaviors and further experiences that
might be recognized as psychopathological.18
17 Note that the notion of sense-making might admit some opaqueness to a person’s experience and behavior;
not everything is accessible to reflexive awareness and reasoning. This is to some extent unavoidable given
that we also make sense of the world together with others. In this sense, symptoms could be expressive
without a person being aware of it, thereby reflecting a limitation of the external resources or possibilities of a
person’s social network for joint sense-making rather than of the individual’s capacities.
18 Note, again, that understanding or evaluating could also be practical or prereflective embodied understand-
ing; it need not require the person’s reflective awareness. Not every evaluation might be explicit. One way of
knowing implicitly, for instance, is given through embodied social emotions such as shame, guilt, pain of
rejection, etc., that can drive our behavior even though we are not always aware of it.
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The basic idea, more concretely, is that the trouble générateur in disorders of the self
is a particular version of the general struggle for self-maintenance, specified in terms of
an existential oscillation between the intrinsic striving for emancipation and indepen-
dence (distinction) and the striving for connection and open-ness (participation), as well
as of the ongoing subjective evaluations a person is making to this end. Since the
strivings are opposed to each other, and yet both are required in order for a person to
become and remain a coherent self, the continuous oscillation thereby aims to bring
about a state of quasi-equilibrium between distinction and participation. Subjectively
speaking, a disorder of self is a state of suffering from experienced (continuous)
violations of either the goal of distinction or of participation, or of what the person
evaluates as an appropriate balance between them. Objectively speaking, psychopa-
thology is a form of self-organization that exhibits particular struggles in the oscillation
between and integration of the two dimensions.
The presented view entails a distributed stance regarding the constituents of self and
self-organization. Self-organization, whether or not it is symptomatic, is an intersub-
jectively open process and involves the individual’s continuous engagement with or
disengagement from the social environment. This chimes well with previous work in
developmental psychology. Minuchin, for instance, emphasises that the right unit of
observation for understanding disorders in the family context is the dyads or triads
formed between family members; in other words, between the parent and a child, or
among siblings (Minuchin 1985), and not individuals in isolation. On such a view, in
determining the trouble générateur, it does not suffice to look at individual physiolog-
ical structures, be they neurological (as in Ebisch and Gallese’s proposal) or sensori-
motor-based. But neither would it suffice to consider an individual’s behavior, say in
terms of her social skills or abilities, such as perspective-taking, for example.
Ontologically speaking, psychopathologies of the self are relational or social structures,
dynamically emerging through the individual in its relations and interactions with the
social world. The possibility of achieving a balance or quasi-stable sense of self through
the equilibrium of distinction and participation is thus always also dependent on the
social relations and interactions that a person is engaged in, on their quality, and on the
degree to which they allow a negotiation and balance of the two opposed goals. It
follows then that the trouble générateur does not reside or originate within the patient
(in her brain or body or phenomenology), nor simply outside, in the patient’s social
environment, but rather within both, i.e. in the relational dynamics between them.
Let me now conclude this paper by coming back and applying these considerations
to the discussion of a particular case of a disorder of self: schizophrenia.
5 Conclusion: schizophrenia as a disorder of enactive autonomy
In this paper I have first discussed Parnas and Sass’s and Ebisch and Gallese’s
arguments concerning the trouble générateur in schizophrenia, and I have offered a
basic perspective on disorders of the self, informed by an enactive, autonomy-based
approach to the self. I have argued that both proposals have advantages: the insight of
Parnas and Sass is that the trouble générateur in schizophrenia has to do with the
experienced altered sense of self, and requires an account of the symptomatic experi-
ence. I argued further that Ebisch and Gallese are right to emphasize the need for an
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explanation beyond experiences, as well as the role of a functioning boundary between
the person and her social environment in establishing a coherent sense of self. The
problem with both approaches is, so I argued, that their account of the self and
subjectivity entails a body-based individualism and that they downplay the status and
role of altered self experiences and their underlying physiological structures by com-
paring them to the normal case.
The enactive alternative to the trouble générateur is grounded in our existential
condition as social selves who strive to engage with others and need this engagement in
order to generate and maintain a coherent sense of self. This approach conjoins a
phenomenological account with an organizational perspective on the self as a meaning
making and identity creating subject.
For the particular case of schizophrenia this suggests that schizophrenia is at the
heart, like any other psychopathology of the self, deeply concerned with a subject’s
social existence. A person with schizophrenia still strives to create a stable sense of self,
and also to negotiate the tension between being a self that is at once able to connect to
others and to remain a subject in her own right. She continuously evaluates herself and
her relations with others accordingly.
In line with Parnas and Sass, I suggest that the trouble générateur in schizophrenia
has indeed to do with the experience of a stable sense of self. But within the enactive
logic of the precarious organizational dynamics of self-construction we can elaborate
on this phenomenological insight, making sense of the fact that the sense of self is not
stable in schizophrenia and that subjects with the condition have extreme difficulties
maintaining a boundary between self and other. The suggestion is that, in schizophre-
nia, the intersubjective dynamics of a person and her social environment enact a form
of self-organization that is evaluated as risking or violating both of the subject’s basic
norms at the same time, i.e. the ability to remain a distinct subject and the ability to be
connected to others.
Ebisch and Gallese are thus correct that the boundary between self/other is
the key element for understanding schizophrenia. But on the enactive view we
can now also explain why this should be the case. The proposal for the trouble
générateur in schizophrenia is that the person’s self-organization continuously
risks losing its own coherence (quasi-stability) while the person also continu-
ously strives to maintain it and thus to oscillate between distinction and
participation. Whenever she tries to accommodate one of the needs, she simul-
taneously risks having to face the respective other, never safely experiencing a
balance between them. In this way the two dimensions become increasingly
more decoupled. As a consequence of this decoupling, the person must expe-
rience extreme tensions and must develop strategies for preventing an organi-
zational break-down. More specifically, there is a sense of too much distinction
and also of too much participation. The former leads to feelings of isolation,
the latter to a loss of boundaries and an experienced immersion with others.
Since distinction and participation are seen as inextricably linked and dependent
on each other, each mode only makes full sense against the background of the
respective other. Accordingly, on the one hand, the isolation in schizophrenia is
an isolation from others, and the suffering from it hints at the same time at the
goal of remaining connected to them (participation). On the other hand, the
immersion with others amounts to a distance from oneself as emancipated
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subject, the suffering from immersion hints at the goal of being a person in
one’s own right (distinction). As a consequence, the person not only continu-
ously experiences some of the most excruciating human threats, the loss of self
and the isolation from others, but also a continuous extreme tension due to the
lack of balance between them. A logical way of preventing organisational
breakdown (the loss of compatibility of distinction and participation) would
be to find ways to experience either of the two primordial modes in a safe way,
for instance by diminishing the risk of failing the respective other’s needs or by
trying to temporally Bsilence^ one dimension. The person might Bchoose^ to
seek stronger experiences of distinction so as to diminish tension experienced
within the participatory dimension, and she might Bchoose^ to give up more
boundaries to make up for tension within the distinction dimension. Eventually,
however, the person will have to accommodate the neglected need, thus
returning to a vicious circle of attempted and failed alleviation of the tension
between them. This failure, I suggest, lies at the heart of the boundary loss that
Ebisch and Gallese rightfully assume. A coherent sense of self needs to balance
the need for emancipation and for connection.
The tragedy of schizophrenia is a reflection of a basic tragedy of the human
condition. When a person is unable to even remotely integrate the need of distinction
and participation, she ceases experiencing coherence as a subject. She is not someone
others can connect to, nor someone others perceive as independent subject. The
boundaries to other people become either blurry or inexistent in her striving for
participation (risk of immersion). But at the same time they remain rigid and clashing
with expectations of the social environment, when she strives for distinction (risk of
isolation).
The presented proposal does more than describing symptoms in terms of the absence
of normalcy. We can begin to understand why a person’s sense of self in schizophrenia
might differ from that of other people. The self-organizing self in schizophrenia strives
to observe its basic laws of self-organization, but at the same time it must continuously
violate them. Even if one might struggle to empathize with the extreme or incompre-
hensible nature of symptomatic behaviors, this approach to the trouble générateur
might help to get a grasp on the existential dimensions of the struggle that a person with
schizophrenia experiences.
Methodologically speaking, the present proposal suggests that while psychopathol-
ogy research needs phenomenology, sometimes it also needs to complement it with an
organisational and normative perspective on subjectivity thereby allowing us to relate
subjective experiences back to the self-organization of the person in question. While
considering the neurological underpinning of experiences is an important aspect of such
an endeavor, it remains accidental when it is not also informed by a systemic perspec-
tive from which neurological processes are seen in the light of their contribution to a
larger social organization. It follows from the idea that the self is organized through
social interactions and relations that the genesis and explanation of schizophrenia
cannot remain limited to the individual, be it at the level of phenomenological insight
or at the level of neurological processes underlying subjective experiences. The
organization and maintenance of a coherent sense of self is a distributed process,
involving individual and interpersonal processes. On the presented view, the trouble
générateur of the disorder lies therefore also within the social environment of a patient,
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be it within the family, in the relationship with an emotionally close partner, or any
other social context that is deemed to be highly relevant to a person’s self.19
It goes without saying that much more needs to be said in order to specify the
enactive approach to disorders of the self and to do justice to the heterogeneity of
symptoms in the various disorders of the schizophrenia spectrum. The paper can
be seen as an invitation for further elaboration, both in theory and in practice. A
major aspect of this will be to better understand the role of the enactive body as
expression and mediator of a social existence and the need to assess bodily
experiences as they emerge in social relations and through ongoing interactions
with others.
It is my hope that the present paper can help to set the ground for a new
understanding of schizophrenia by providing a basic enactive heuristic. Within this
heuristic, the disorder is approached in terms of interpersonally mediated self-
organisation, and its symptoms are accounted for by assuming that there exists a
normative relation between subjective experiences and the self as a coherent whole.
This view presumes that all symptoms in schizophrenia are ultimately of social
nature and can be considered as sense-making processes in a circular fashion: on the
one hand, as very particular expressions and strategies of a person’s struggle to
maintain her self, and on the other hand, in terms of resources made available
through the qualities of the dynamical interplay of an individual in interaction with
and in relation to others.
The present proposal takes a generally positive outlook for treatment: if, as is
suggested on the enactive view, the self is open and intersubjectively co-constructed,
then a person with schizophrenia should remain not only open for negative perturba-
tions, but also for positive ones. The prediction would be that any therapy approach
which takes the intersubjective dynamics that a patient is involved in seriously, and that
helps accommodating the patient’s struggle for self-maintenance and rebalancing the
dimensions of distinction and participation, should be expected to have better outcomes
than that one focusing on individualistic interventions, be they on the patient’s brain or
her body in isolation from others.
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